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Preventable medical errors result in the loss of 200,000 lives per year with 
associated financial and operational burdens on organizations and society. 
Widespread preventable patient harm occurs despite increases in healthcare 
regulations. High reliability organization theory contributes to improved safety 
and may potentially reverse this trend. This single case study explored the 
introduction of a safety culture and subsequent improvements in patient safety 
in a reliability-seeking organization. Fourteen participants from a subacute 
nursing facility were selected using purposeful sampling criterion. Data were 
collected through participant interviews, document reviews, and group 
observation. Five themes emerged from an analysis of collected data including 
process standardization, checks and redundancy, authority migration, 
communication, and teamwork. The themes uncovered the need for extensive 
education and training, communication, and teamwork to improve patient 
safety. The results of the study may be useful to improve safety and enhance 
leadership to promote a culture of safe patient care. Keywords: High Reliability 
Organizations, Patient Safety, Subacute Nursing Facility, Case Study 
  
Preventable errors in patient care continue to occur despite the efforts of regulators, 
government, and healthcare organizations. These errors cause harm to patients, and present 
financial and operational burdens on an organization (Colón-Emeric et al., 2010). The number 
and impact of errors is astounding. Andel, Davidow, Hollander, and Moreno (2012) reported 
that over 200,000 deaths occur annually due to medical errors. Between 2003 and 2010, there 
were 1.04 million medication errors reported to the United States Pharmacopeia MEDMAX 
system (Schiff, 2015). Researchers estimated an annual cost for preventable errors of nearly 
$38 billion (Debourgh & Prion, 2012). Additional organizational costs may include staffing, 
supplies, and litigation. Staff are adversely affected when a patient is harmed, and an 
organization engaged in unsafe care may experience high turnover (Goh, Chan, & Kuziemsky, 
2013; O’Bierne, Sterling, Palacios-Derflingher, Hohman, & Zwicker, 2012). Punitive costs 
have additionally contributed to the rising cost of healthcare, and some organizations have 
responded by engaging in defensive medicine (Catino, 2009). 
Yin (2014) identifies the case study as a tool for exploring a business phenomenon. In 
a qualitative case study, Yin further states that the results from multiple qualitative studies may 
be combined to enhance generalizability, as a large sample size does in a quantitative study. In 
this qualitative single case study, we explored the introduction of a safety culture and 
subsequent improvements in patient safety in a reliability-seeking organization. Fourteen 
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participants from a subacute nursing facility were selected using purposeful criterion sampling. 
We collected data through participant interviews, document reviews, and group observation. 
Five themes emerged from an analysis of collected data including process standardization, 
checks and redundancy, authority migration, and communication and teamwork. We begin this 
paper with the background of High Reliability Organizations. 
 
Background 
 
Preventable medical harm remains a persistent problem (Diller et al., 2013). Recent 
changes from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) increases the accountability for 
errors by restricting financial reimbursement for poor patient care (Knudson, 2013). For 
example, Medicare discontinued additional payments for certain hospital-acquired conditions 
that CMS deemed preventable (Lee et al., 2012). Thus, medical providers are at risk if strategies 
are not in place to address patient safety and quality. 
Many healthcare administrators and regulators have initiated changes without making 
significant progress (Diller et al., 2013; Sheps & Cardiff, 2011). However, some administrators 
have made progress in reducing preventable errors, improving patient safety, and reducing 
operational costs while complying with regulatory demands. One organization quickly grew to 
become one of the largest pediatric intensive care units in the United States, yet maintained a 
mortality rate lower than smaller organizations (van Stralen, 2008). Another organization 
reported that they averted 1,500 deaths in 2010 (Pryor, Hendrich, Henkel, Beckmann, & 
Tersigni, 2011). A subacute nursing facility reduced 911 calls, installed Intensive Care Unit 
(ICU) ventilators, and improved the quality of life for chronically ill patients (van Stralen, 
Calderon, Lewis, & Roberts, 2008). These organizations attributed their success to the 
application of High Reliability Organization (HRO) theory. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
 
High Reliability Organizations are organizations that conduct operations with minimal 
error, over an extended time, and consistently make decisions that result in high quality and 
high reliability (Roberts, 1990). HRO theory is interdisciplinary in nature, and has been a part 
of programs to improve safety in military, commercial aviation, public safety, and nuclear 
power organizations (Casler, 2013; O’Neil & Kriz, 2013). Much of the early HRO literature 
originated from within the firefighting industry. Safety concerns grew after several unnecessary 
deaths occurred during two major wild-land fires (Weick, 1996). Principles stemming from 
HRO theory are also increasingly used in healthcare (Hartmann, Meterko, Zhao, Palmer, & 
Berlowitz, 2013; Thomassen et al., 2011). The structure of HRO centers on several basic 
principles that together promote a culture of safety. These structures include (a) developing 
and maintaining standard processes; (b) implementing checks and redundancy to mitigate 
potential failure; (c) deferring to individuals with the most information; and, (d) developing 
teams that openly communicate about failure to prevent recurrence of unsafe incidents 
(Hartmann et al., 2013). An organization that is reliability-seeking is preoccupied with failure 
and actively works toward building and enhancing a culture of safety (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; 
Roberts & Bea, 2001; Shabot, Monroe, Inurria, Garbade, & France, 2013). 
HRO principles are gaining ground in healthcare (Chassin & Loeb, 2013), though the 
penetration within the industry is still limited. HRO influences the rate of patient safety 
indicators (PSIs) in an organization (Singer, Lin, Falwell, Gaba, & Baker, 2009), human error 
attributable to fatigue and stress (Norris, Currie, & Lecko, 2012), and development of 
interdepartmental teams with open channels of communication (Riley, Davis, Miller, & 
McCullough, 2010). Healthcare is unique compared to these other industries. In healthcare, 
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adverse events can happen frequently and may affect a single patient rather than a large group 
(Bagnara, Parlangeli, & Tartaglia, 2010). Healthcare organizations need a structure to support 
safety processes, and safety must be an organizational goal (Hartmann et al., 2013). In 
contrasting organizational culture and safety climate, Hartmann et al. described culture as a set 
of values that guide individual behaviors, while climate is more involved in organizational 
behaviors and goals. An HRO requires a management-led organizational climate committed to 
safety, where management fosters a safety culture in which employees may internalize safety 
initiatives and contribute individually to the safety climate. 
Three of the authors have over 80 years combined experience in health and human 
services. One author served in the United States Navy, which is the organization where some 
of the early HRO research was conducted. All authors are presently working in higher 
education, as faculty or administrators. The improvement of patient safety is a priority for the 
authors, who share an interest in making an impact on the safety culture in the fields of health 
and human services. 
 
Research Method and Design 
 
Our study was a case study design, as outlined by Yin (2014). The purpose of a case 
study is to gather comprehensive data from different sources for a specific case with predefined 
scope (Houghton, Murphy, Shaw, & Casey, 2013). This design was appropriate because our 
goal was to explore what components of HRO theory were useful in reducing risks to patient 
safety in a subacute nursing facility. 
This qualitative, single case study explored how the perceptions and experiences of 
nursing and respiratory staff affected the successful transition of the organization into a 
reliability-seeking organization. The qualitative case study design was selected because a case 
study can be used to expand existing theory or to confirm prior discoveries (Houghton, Casey, 
Shaw, & Murphy, 2013). A case study is also appropriate to understand a shared experience 
within its context (Watkins, 2012). The following question framed our research: what 
components of HRO theory were useful in reducing risks to patient safety in a subacute nursing 
facility? The purpose of this study was to identify how the application of HRO theory was 
understood and applied by frontline staff during the organizational transition toward reliability 
to guide other organizations similarly committed to improving safety.  
The setting for the study was a Medicare designated subacute facility. Subacute 
facilities provide skilled services to patients immediately after, or instead of, acute 
hospitalization to treat complex medical conditions (CMS, 2012). We purposefully selected 14 
participants from a subacute nursing facility that serves high-risk, technology-dependent 
children in the western United States. To receive care, patients must depend on one or more 
technologies, which may include ICU-level ventilators, or gastrostomy or jejunostomy tubes. 
The facility employs clinical, dietary, childhood development staff, and additional support 
staff. The clinical staff employed at the facility includes nurses, respiratory care practitioners, 
and certified nursing assistants. Participants were selected from nursing and respiratory care 
specialties and were not managers at the time of the organizational transition toward high-
reliability. 
 
Data Collection 
 
The study was initiated upon approval by the Walden University Institutional Research 
Board, with the associated approval number of 10-03-13-0313263. Data collection included 
semistructured interviews, observations of nursing and respiratory staff, and organizational 
documentation reviews regarding the application of HRO theory and improvement in patient 
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safety. Our strategy aligns with what Yin (2014) describes as triangulation. The process of 
triangulation includes gathering data from two or more sources (Bekhet & Zauszniewski, 
2012), and is a major advantage of a case study design (Yin). While the primary researcher 
knew some participants through prior employment at the facility, we took steps to minimize 
bias. We followed the strategy of Anderson (2010) who indicated that to reduce bias, the 
researcher must put aside prior knowledge of the problem and focus solely on data collection. 
We designed semistructured interview questions (see Appendix A) to allow flexibility 
and consistency. Interviews took place in a meeting room assigned by the organization 
administrators. The meeting room was located in an unoccupied wing of the building, apart 
from peers or supervisors. The room had limited access, and the participants were able to speak 
freely without fear of someone overhearing the conversation. Meeting in a familiar place was 
beneficial for the participant. The primary researcher conducted individual interviews to 
protect the participant’s privacy and to encourage open communication. After each interview, 
we transcribed the interview verbatim. Because the organization’s leaders were interested in 
the outcome of this study, participants participated in the interview during their scheduled work 
period.  
Observational data for this study came from direct observations of caregivers during 
the course of their daily routines. The primary researcher observed interactions between 
nursing and respiratory staff during shift changes and group rounds. Observations occurred 
during 30-minute intermittent periods over the timespan of one week. We used an observation 
guide to determine which HRO concepts are exhibited among the nursing and respiratory staff. 
Extensive notes were taken during observations. These notes included data regarding staff 
interactions with peers and staff in non-clinical positions, general communication styles, and 
any occurrences or interactions that were relevant in answering the research question. These 
notes did not contain protected health information or compromise the rights of the patients. 
Healthcare organizations maintain extensive documentation in compliance with 
regulatory agencies. This documentation was useful to confirm information obtained through 
interviews and observations. The primary researcher reviewed the organization’s Policy and 
Procedure manual, de-identified statistical data on patient safety from prior research, data 
reflecting 911 emergency calls, hospital transfer records, and training documents. All 
documents reviewed for the purpose of triangulation were provided by facility administrators 
and did not contain patient identifiers. Proprietary information was not disclosed during the 
document reviews. This confidentiality ensured that the patients and the organization are 
protected from unnecessary exposure. 
 
Data Analysis 
 
Data were coded manually using Microsoft Excel. Key words and concepts were 
identified through an extensive review of the transcribed interviews. Frequently used words or 
phrases were organized by frequency of use. From this organized list, primary and secondary 
codes were determined based on similarity. The following participant response represents the 
code for Safer Care. In response to a question about the safety culture after the transition toward 
reliability, Participant 12 said, “It improved. I mean, the patient care improved immensely. 
Patients weren’t sent out, you know, every week.” In another response to a question about the 
role participants play in patient safety, the code of Teamwork was established. “There is a lot 
more teamwork on the floor, helping one another. Making sure that, you know, nobody hurt 
their back, or the residents. More Hoyer lift use (Participant 2).” 
During coding and analysis, the data were compared with descriptions identified in the 
literature review of High Reliability Organizations. Data that corroborated the conceptual 
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framework were identified and explored. This was done to identify the extent the staff adopted 
or integrated HRO concepts. 
 
Research Findings 
 
The research subquestion addressed in this study was what components of HRO theory 
were useful in reducing risks to patient safety in a subacute nursing facility? Themes from 
participant responses included policies, patient care improvements, education & training, staff 
improvements, quality of life, safety, communication, teamwork, and risk mitigation. Of these 
themes, policies, education & training, safety, communication, teamwork, and risk mitigation 
directly correspond with HRO principles. Subthemes in patient care improvements, staff 
improvements, and quality of life were also consistent with HRO theory. Themes were further 
categorized as they were applicable to specific HRO concepts including (a) process 
standardization, (b) checks and redundancy, (c) authority migration, and (d) communication 
and teamwork.  
 
Process Standardization 
 
Participant responses detailed the changes that occurred during the organizational 
transition toward reliability. Policies and procedures enforced strategies to protect the staff and 
patient from injuries. Participant 2 stated, “I think it was a little more lax back then, as time 
went on we just got more and more rules - as far as having two people with moving residents, 
and changing them and bathing them.” Once new policies were implemented, they were 
promptly distributed among the staff. As Participant 1 described it, “I know whenever we have 
new policies they post it up on the board, or we go over it at staff meetings.” 
One policy was implemented to ensure mindfulness. Staff is required to stay in their 
assigned patient rooms at all times, or find a replacement before leaving. Participant 3 said, 
“When you’re in there, with the room, you have to have the apnea monitor on at all times. 
Someone always has to be there at all times.” Four other participants made similar comments. 
Another policy designed to prevent accidents is the requirement that bed rails be up at all times. 
“Just making sure side rails are up, and things are off of the floor, and the floors are clean and 
tidy; that kind of thing” (Participant 8). This was echoed by Participant 11, who said, “The rails 
will be all the time up.” Managers also implemented certain infection control procedures. Staff 
must change tracheostomy ties immediately after patient baths to prevent irritated skin 
conditions (Participants 1 & 14). Participant responses indicated that organizational leaders 
implemented, and continue to implement standard processes to improve safety. 
 
Checks and Redundancy 
 
Checklists and redundant procedures were developed in the organization. Managers use 
checklists as they make rounds (Participant 1). Transfer packets are also included any time a 
patient is transferred to ensure medication and relevant patient information is passed on to other 
caregivers (Participant 1). Patient assessment forms were adapted to improve the quality of 
reporting, which prompted staff to include critical information that might have been forgotten 
(Participant 8). These checklists and procedures take into account human factors, such as 
momentary lapses in attention to make sure that critical information is recorded and distributed 
to other caregivers to ensure patient safety. 
Checks may also include enhanced reporting. Staff has access to a form designed to 
enable anonymous reporting of incidents or unsafe conditions (Participant 1). This form serves 
as a check to make sure that managers know all the information, especially if it is something 
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the staff is not comfortable discussing in public. Managers can distribute this information, and 
changes can be made as required. Organizational policies were also adapted to increase 
redundancy.  
Organizational policies designed to improve redundancy included the bath buddy 
system, lifting procedures, and preventative care. Nursing and respiratory managers compare 
reports at the end of their shifts to make sure no information was left out of the reports 
(Participant 1). Tracheostomy ties are changed and baths given with at least two staff members. 
“If we are going to do a shower, we have to have a bath buddy” (Participant 13). Four other 
participants made similar comments regarding bath buddies. The second staff member can call 
for help if a problem occurs, and the first staff member can immediately begin addressing the 
problem (Participant 13). Weight limits are in place, and specific equipment is designated when 
bathing, lifting, or transferring a patient. Participant 8 described these policies, and the 
description was similar to comments from seven other participants. 
 
Two persons had to go to the showers. I remember that. And baths always had 
to be a two-person job. Lifts and transfers. Anybody over 30 pounds was a 
mandatory two-person lift. And the Hoyer lift. I think it was after 40 pounds 
you had to use the Hoyer lift. 
 
By ensuring staff work together on routine tasks, the potential for error is reduced and 
organizational knowledge is increased. Participants noted that there is greater awareness about 
the roles of their counterparts in different departments. Staff was cross-trained to increase the 
response time to patients in early stages of a medical crisis. Participant 8 described the cross-
training.  
 
The nurses were also cross trained. We had to take a vent management class. 
Not that we would be doing any of the changes or anything on the ventilator, 
but more so you would recognize when there was a problem. You would 
recognize what the different alarms were on the vent. 
 
Cross training staff so they learn what different alarms mean, or pay attention to symptoms not 
specific to one’s own area of care, improves the response times for minor changes that might 
otherwise go unnoticed. 
 
Authority Migration 
 
The component of authority migration is found in the participant responses regarding 
empowerment or decision-making. Frontline employees are often better able to notice subtle 
differences in the condition of a patient, which makes them an ideal resource for discovering 
potential problems (Mauelshagen, Denyer, Carter, & Pollard, 2013). An organization with a 
strong safety culture will empower employees to make decisions (Singer et al., 2009). The 
comments from participants indicated that they understood this cultural framework.  
Participant 6 discussed early responses, stating the staff is able to catch potentially 
unsafe things quickly. Participant 12 made a similar statement, indicating that the staff was 
able to recognize the early signs of a problem.  
 
Well, it really improved patient safety, because we were able to put them on 
ventilators here, and we definitely know what we are doing. We did it by 
observation. We did it by monitoring sats and end tidal CO2s, without blood 
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gases. And we were able to keep patients that would have gone out. We got 
them over the acute phase of their disease process. 
 
These responses are representative of similar comments made by several participants. 
The responses support the idea that the frontline staff is able to recognize subtle changes that 
might not be easily detected by management (Mauelshagen et al., 2013). An organization that 
recognizes the value of early detection would do well to empower employees to make decisions 
to address quickly unsafe conditions. 
Participants consistently described the concepts of decision making and empowerment. 
Staff felt that they were given the opportunity to provide input in the care of the patients 
(Participant 8). Participant 12 said that because the staff was empowered to make decisions, 
the staff took ownership of their decisions. Staff empowerment resulted from the 
implementation of HRO (Participant 9). Participants commented that they were well trained in 
their fields, and that management recognized this training by empowering them to make 
decisions (Participants 6 & 12). The organization actively included staff in identification of 
risks, and empowered staff to act to mitigate those risks (van Stralen et al., 2008). Participant 
responses indicated that the staff felt empowered to make decision that would make their 
patients safer. 
 
Communication and Teamwork 
 
Managers and administrators encouraged communication, and communication 
requirements were built into organizational policies. Communication was a regular theme in 
the data. Participant 2 said, “I think everybody’s a little bit more verbal. You know, if they see 
a problem they let you know – let the right person know.” Another participant talked about the 
effect approachability of managers had on communication. “I think department communication 
really relies on the people in those management positions – how easy they are to approach. 
When I first started working, the nursing manager was very difficult to approach. The team we 
have now …is easy to approach (Participant 10).” Managers held an open door policy to 
encourage staff to communicate any issues, problems, or concerns.  
Management conducts “whiteboard meetings” to convey reminders about duties and 
policies, and to alert the staff to problems that need to be addressed (Participant 5). We conduct 
in-services in response to safety incidents (Participant 1). Participant 12 said that the use of a 
knowledge base helped to make patients safer. Knowledge transfer occurred because of the 
high level of communication between staff members (Participant 12). Participant 3 suggested 
that showing how things can go wrong if the policies are not followed is useful in training new 
staff. This idea was similar to what Participant 8 said about how important it is that new staff 
absorbs the training received in preceptor classes. Participant 12 discussed how failures might 
be system problems rather than individual problems, which is consistent with what Roberts and 
Bea (2001) said on the matter. Failures are regularly reflected upon within the organization to 
prevent future occurrences. Additionally, pertinent information is communicated to relevant 
staff to prevent potential failures. 
Participants discussed differences in communication that occurred because of the 
organizational transition toward reliability. Some of the participant responses concerned the 
sharing of information with team members. This includes letting other departments and 
colleagues know what is going on with a patient (Participants 5 & 6), sharing insights or lessons 
learned with other team members (Participant 10), or making sure relevant information is 
passed on to the appropriate personnel (Participant 1).  
Teamwork was also a common theme in the participant responses. The types of 
teamwork frequently referenced by the participants included departmental integration, lifting 
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or bathing in staff pairs, and other similar team activities. The concept of teamwork relating to 
HRO theory also includes how participants saw their roles within the organization. Participant 
12 said that with HRO theory, staff is aware of their roles within the team. Participant 7 said 
that the staff is on the same page. Participant 8 said that staff is aware of the role they play in 
safety. “It made them feel that they were doing an important part in maintaining the safety of 
the kids. I think we felt like we just played a really important part in maintaining the safety of 
the patient.” These comments are representative of the larger theme of teamwork within the 
organization. The staff feels confident that they play a significant role in keeping patients and 
fellow staff safe. 
 
Summary of HRO Themes 
 
Organizational leaders implemented policies and procedures to develop and maintain 
standard processes. The policies and procedures were also used in implementing checks and 
redundancy to mitigate potential failure. Policies regarding the empowerment of staff and 
encouraging decision-making by the staff were in support of the HRO concept of authority 
migration, or letting the person with the most information make decisions. Teams were 
developed, and reporting was emphasized in support of the HRO concept of open 
communication between team members to reduce repeated failures. 
 
Document Reviews 
 
 
Figure 1. 911 Calls Placed During the Transition toward Reliability. Data obtained 
from internal document review. 
 
A review of internal documentation supported organizational assertions that patient 
safety improved. Typical nursing homes will call 911 to transfer patients to acute care hospitals 
when a patient’s health deteriorates, not being equipped to respond to rapidly changing 
conditions (van Stralen et al., 2008). As the organization developed a culture of safety, the staff 
gained skills required to handle dynamic patient conditions within the facility, reducing their 
dependence on external healthcare services. Facility records showed the number of 911 calls 
48
22
24
27
25
17
9
11
16
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
418   The Qualitative Report 2017 
dropped significantly between 1996 and 1997, and remained low through 2004. The majority 
of these calls were placed to address respiratory distress.  
 
Contrasting Costs of ICU and Subacute Care 
 
 
Figure 2. Contrasting Costs of ICU and Subacute Care. Data obtained from internal 
facility document review. 
 
Documents also indicated the cost savings attributed to the improvement of patient care. 
These savings are indicated in Figure 2. The cost of four days of care in a pediatric ICU was 
compared to three days at the facility, and indicated a cost savings of $6,830. Comparing the 
costs of physician services during the same period showed an additional savings of $1,263. 
This data is useful in understanding the changes attributed to the organizational shift toward 
reliability within the context of the transition.  
 
Negative Feedback Model 
 
We created a negative feedback model (Figure 3) to indicate the relationship between 
outside and internal influences on patient safety and quality of care. Feedback models are used 
to illustrate the effect decisions and actions have on processes and outcomes (Sterman, 1989). 
The model reflects the literature concerning the costs and causes of adverse patient safety 
events, and reflects both the literature and the data obtained in this study regarding the benefits 
of using HRO principles to improve safety. Regulations are implemented in response to adverse 
patient safety events, yet may have a negative impact on patient or consumer satisfaction 
measures. This negative impact is mitigated if the regulations are supplemented with HRO 
principles. 
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Patient Safety Culture and High Reliability Organizations: A Negative Feedback Model 
Figure 3. Padgett, J. D. & Gossett, K. D. (2014). Patient Safety Culture and High 
Reliability Organizations: A Negative Feedback System. Adapted from Gossett (1989). 
 
Patient drives, needs, and wants are the outside driver in this negative feedback system 
(Figure 3). These drives, needs, and wants are directly related to the implementation of 
regulations. As patients are harmed or are concerned about safety, regulators take action and 
pass laws, implement rules and regulations, and require policies and procedures to be 
established by health and human service administrators. Regulations have a direct relationship 
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with human factor errors, indicating that an increase in regulations contributes to an increase 
in human factor errors. Poor communication, blame culture, compassion fatigue, and staff 
turnover are associated with increased demands and pressure resulting from increased 
regulations and scrutiny. Patient satisfaction measures have an inverse relationship with patient 
drives, needs, and wants as well. This means that as patient satisfaction increases, the factors 
that contribute to an increase in external regulations decreases. Costs associated with 
unnecessary care, litigation, and defensive medicine, are directly related with regulations. Costs 
increase as the number of regulations increase. 
As indicated in the model (Figure 3), when regulations are used in conjunction with 
HRO principles, costs associated with adverse events decrease, and human factor errors also 
decrease. When human factors, including blame culture, compassion fatigue, and poor 
communication are reduced, staff competency, organizational knowledge, and a positive 
relationship between patients and care staff increase. This, in turn, leads to an improvement in 
the quality of patient care, an improvement in client functioning measures, and improvement 
in patient safety or satisfaction measures. 
Adverse events are inversely related to patient safety and quality of care. When adverse 
events decrease, patient safety improves. Adverse events are directly related to increased costs, 
stemming from litigation, unnecessary care instigated by regulations, and defensive medicine 
in response to regulations. Quality of care and quality of life are directly related to client 
functioning measures, which are directly related to patient and consumer satisfaction measures, 
and in turn reduce the demands for services based on needs and wants of the patients. 
This model is structured around existing literature regarding the problem of patient 
safety in healthcare, and the steps taken to reduce risks and improve care. The study findings 
are consistent with HRO literature regarding the improvement in quality of care and in 
reporting incidents to regulators. Participants identified specific policies and procedures 
implemented to mitigate the risk of harm to patients and staff. Some of the new procedures 
limited costs associated with additional lab work and 911 transfers. 
Human factors were also identified in the study findings. A reduction of blame and a 
commitment to improving organizational knowledge contributes to open lines of 
communication and improved teamwork. Many of the participants had been working for the 
organization for over 10 years, which suggests the culture change was also effective in reducing 
turnover.  
The model also identifies the relationship between patient satisfaction measurements 
and patient drives, needs, and wants. This inverse relationship completes the feedback loop. As 
patient satisfaction is improved, the drives, needs, and wants that lead to increased legislation 
and regulation are reduced. When patients are harmed, new legislation and regulations increase. 
 
Limitations 
 
Data were obtained from the staff of a small, subacute nursing facility. However, 
because there are applications for larger facilities and hospitals, further research within the 
context of these larger organizations may be required. The collected data came from a small 
group of participants within the target organization. A larger group may yield different results 
or could further support the findings in this study. 
A perceived limitation of the case study design is a lack of generalizability (Yin, 2014). 
Yin described the way empirical studies and qualitative studies build upon prior work. The new 
work adds to the generalization of findings. Future research in other organizations may build 
on this data and expand the generalizability of this study. 
Organizations may also perceive value as relevant, relative to the specific geographic 
area. Although healthcare regulations vary within the United States and internationally, the 
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international and interdisciplinary nature of HRO mitigates this perceived limitation. Patients 
across international boundaries are at risk, which further reduces the geographic limitation of 
this study. 
 
Discussion 
 
Study findings were consistent with the literature on using HRO to improve patient 
safety. These principles included an organizational focus on discovering and mitigating risks, 
and a commitment to consistent and constant improvement. The policies and procedures 
implemented by organizational leaders were consistent with the HRO concepts leading to the 
development of standard processes; implementing checks and redundancy; encouraging open 
and honest feedback free from a risk of retribution; developing a flexible and resilient structure; 
improving communication and teamwork; and enhancing decision making and leadership skills 
for all staff, regardless of rank or position. 
Though this study was designed to explore the improvement of patient safety, several 
participants offered insight into the improvement of staff safety. This affected the way the staff 
viewed their role in the organization, and improved trust between staff and the organization, 
which had an effect on the perceptions and attitudes of staff as new policies and procedures 
were developed. Additional research may be conducted to further explore how focusing on 
staff safety affects an organization’s culture. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The qualitative, explorative single case study was useful in exploring how the 
application of HRO principles positively affected the successful transition of a healthcare 
organization into a reliability-seeking organization. The use of interviews, document reviews, 
and group observations helped in exploration of the staff’s experiences during the transition, 
and how their active participation affected the transition process. These triangulated data 
sources contributed to the validity and applicability of the study. 
Study findings were in alignment with the literature review, and add to the literature in 
the fields of healthcare and patient safety. Transitioning to a reliability-seeking organization 
contributes to a reduction in safety incidents, improves staff perceptions of the organization, 
and reduces costs attributed to unsafe care. One recommendation based on the outcome of this 
study is that management should continue to promote HRO theory to the staff, and increase the 
training and educational opportunities for staff. Another recommendation is that organizational 
leadership reviews the current physician-staff hierarchy and renew some of the empowerment 
and decision-making authority of the staff that has waned over time.  
Patient safety errors are costly to the patient and to the organization treating the patient. 
Governmental regulations have not been effective in reducing preventable harm to patients 
(Downey, Hernandez-Boussard, Banka, & Morton, 2012). Physicians have created silos to 
protect themselves from unrealistic expectations of perfection (Sheps & Cardiff, 2011). Blame 
culture contributes to covering up incidents rather than improving organizational learning 
(Moumtzoglou, 2010; Saleh, Marias, Bakolas, & Cowlagi, 2010). Regulators may improve 
reporting by incorporating HRO theory into new or updated regulations. The increase in 
reporting could help propagate the theory throughout the industry, which would contribute to 
an industry-wide reduction in patient harm. This would reduce the estimated $38 billion 
(Debourgh & Prion, 2012) spent on addressing safety incidents, and improve the quality of life 
for patients. Transitioning to a reliability-seeking organization will contribute to improved 
reporting to regulatory entities, enhance the safety of staff and patients, contribute to staff 
loyalty, and reduce operational and punitive costs. 
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Study findings and this negative feedback model may be used to assist organizations in 
determining areas for improvement to improve patient safety. The model will be useful for 
regulators interested in assisting in industry-wide improvement in patient care. By learning 
how to work together, organizations and regulators can reduce errors in care, which will 
improve patient safety and reduce organizational costs. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A: Interview Questions 
 
1. What was the safety culture like at the organization before HRO was 
introduced? 
2. Describe the current safety culture in the organization. 
3. How did you perceive your role in the safety of your patients before learning 
about HRO? 
4. Describe how you see your role in the safety of your patients now. 
5. Describe your interactions with members of other departments before HRO was 
adopted. 
6. How did your interactions with these other departments change after learning 
about HRO? 
7. Describe how your daily tasks changed during the transition. 
8. Describe any policies or procedures that changed as a result of the transition. 
9. Describe how the managers and administrators handled the transition process. 
10. Describe the communication between departments since HRO was introduced. 
11. What influence did the application of HRO theory have in improving patient 
safety? 
12. In what way did the shift toward reliability affect your perception of the 
organization? 
13. How did the shift toward reliability affect your perception of your job? 
14. How could the transition have been managed better? 
15. How has HRO helped improve the lives of the patients? 
16. What components of HRO theory have been useful in reducing risks to patient 
safety? 
17. Describe any cost savings you are aware of since HRO was introduced. 
18. What were the most important improvements in patient safety since the 
transition toward reliability? 
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